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We analytically determine when a range of abstract social contagion models permit global spread-
ing from a single seed on degree-correlated, undirected random networks. We deduce the expected
size of the largest vulnerable component, a network’s tinderbox-like critical mass, as well as the
probability that infecting a randomly chosen individual seed will trigger global spreading. In the
appropriate limits, our results naturally reduce to standard ones for models of disease spreading
and to the condition for the existence of a giant component. Recent advances in the distributed,
infinite seed case allow us to further determine the final size of global spreading events, when they
occur. To provide support for our results, we derive exact expressions for key spreading quantities
for a simple yet rich family of random networks with bimodal degree distributions.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s,87.19.Xx,87.23.Ge,05.45.-a
Over the last decade, the study of real-world, complex
networks has grown enormously, fueled in no small part
by the advent of readily available, large-scale data sets for
real systems [1, 2]. Understanding the coupled dynam-
ics of both the structural evolution of, and processes on,
complex networks remains a fertile area of investigation.
Of particular importance is the study of contagion, how
entities spread through networked systems, as exempli-
fied by the diffusion of practices, beliefs, ideas, and emo-
tions in social networks [3, 4, 5], disease contagion in
human and animal populations [6, 7], cascading failures
in electrical systems [8, 9], the global spread of computer
viruses on the Web [10, 11], and the collapse of financial
systems [12].
Our present interest lies in contagion processes where
individuals adopt alternate behaviors through imitation
of peers. We specifically investigate a threshold model
of social contagion on random networks—first proposed
and studied by Watts [13]—with the added complication
of arbitrary degree-degree correlations. The model’s ori-
gins lie in the seminal work of Schelling, who employed
a threshold model for a population on a checkerboard to
gain insight into residential segregation [14, 15]. Gra-
novetter [16] subsequently studied a mean-field, random
mixing threshold model which can be seen as a natu-
ral limiting case of the model we consider here. Both
Schelling and Granovetter’s work clearly showed that
global uniformity should not be taken to mean that indi-
viduals have strong or similar preferences, and that small
changes in the distributions of individual preferences
could lead to sharp transitions in the system’s macro-
scopic state.
Placing the threshold model on standard random net-
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works with arbitrary degree distributions gives rise to a
number of novel behaviors not seen in the Granovetter
model. For example, individuals are now distinguish-
able, and a single node changing its state can lead to
a complete transition in the entire system’s state [13].
Moreover, by greatly limiting nodes’ knowledge of the
complete network, behaviors that would immediately die
out when nodes are aware of all other nodes’ states may
now spread globally. Balkanization enhances innovation.
We consider binary systems with nodes being in one
of two states, σ0 and σ1. Initially, all nodes are in state
σ0. Our immediate interest is in determining whether
or not global spreading is possible when a single node is
switched to state σ1, and how this condition is affected
by altering the level of degree-degree correlations. We
then further wish to know two key quantities: (1) the
probability global spreading occurs (Ptrig), and (2) when
it does, to what fraction of the entire network (S).
In finding the probability that global spreading takes
off after switching a single node to state σ1, it is enough
for us to view the problem as one of standard percola-
tion [17, 18]. (Determining the final extent of spreading
requires a distinct approach but nevertheless still capi-
talizes on the locally branching nature of random net-
works [19, 20].) This observation follows from several
well known aspects of random networks.
First, infinite, sparse random networks are locally per-
fectly branching networks, possessing only very long
cycles when sufficiently connected. Thus, a node can
switch to state σ1 in the initial stages of a spreading pro-
cess (started by a single seed) only if a single neighbor
switches to σ1 earlier on. For global spreading to occur,
a network must have a percolating component of these
easily switched ‘vulnerable’ nodes [13]. (By percolating
component, we mean a connected sub-network containing
a non-zero fraction of all nodes.) As the adoption of state
σ1 spreads through this percolating component of vulner-
able nodes, non-vulnerable nodes requiring two or more
Typeset by REVTEX
2neighbors in state σ1 may also begin to switch. Howev-
er, we need focus only on vulnerable nodes to determine
whether global spreading is possible or not. When a per-
colating vulnerable component exists, it may be viewed
as a network’s critical mass, and one that is highly sus-
ceptible since it possesses its own critical mass—exactly
any one of its own members.
Second, our analytic treatment via generating func-
tions is limited to the description of finite network com-
ponents, which indirectly allows us to describe some
aspects of infinite components. Since finite components
are pure branching structures (i.e., they contain no cycles
of any length), all nodes can only switch to σ1 due to the
conversion of a single neighbor, even in the long run.
We structure the paper as follows. After defining the
model fully in Section I, we detail a series of analytic
results in Section II, concerning the probability and size
of macroscopic spreading events. We confirm, via further
analysis and simulations, a number of our calculations for
a simple network containing two kinds of nodes in Sec-
tion III. We offer some concluding remarks in Section IV.
I. MODEL DEFINITION
Each node is initially assigned a ‘response function’
which we take here to be a step function. In effect, each
node is given a fixed threshold τ sampled from a distri-
bution Pthreshold(τ). Node states update in synchrony
at times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . Each node observes the frac-
tion of its neighbors in state σ1, and switches to σ1 if
this fraction meets or exceeds its threshold, τ . Once a
node switches to state σ1, it remains in state σ1 perma-
nently (akin to the SI model for disease spreading [6]).
Asynchronous updating gives the same results for mono-
tonically increasing response functions.
We define the structure of our networks through edge
probabilities, following Newman [21, 22]. In studying a
range of structural aspects of degree-correlated networks
as well as dynamic phenomena on them (especially con-
tagion processes), it is mathematically convenient to use
ejk, the probability that a randomly chosen edge connects
a node with degree j+1 to one with degree k+1, rather
than j and k. The quantity ejk then refers directly to
the number of other edges emanating from the nodes an
edge connects. Normalization is uncomplicated, requir-
ing that
∑∞
j=0
∑∞
k=0 ejk = 1.
While this definition of ejk is clear for directed net-
works, we encounter some subtleties in attempting to
accommodate both undirected and directed networks
with a single notation (even though many expressions
will turn out to be the same). For undirected networks,
which are our primary focus here, we evenly divide the
probability that a randomly selected edge (now direction-
less) connects nodes with degree j+1 and k+1 between
the quantities ejk and ekj . The chance of a randomly
selected edge connecting degree j + 1 and k + 1 nodes is
then ejk + ekj = 2ejk, and the matrix formed by the ejk
is symmetric. We are thus effectively retaining a ghost of
a directed network, as each link must have a designated
first and second node. (For directed networks, ejk need
of course not be symmetric, and other complications are
possible concerning the correlations between an individ-
ual node’s in-degree and out-degree.)
We also have the important quantity qk which is the
probability that in randomly choosing an edge, and then
randomly choosing one end of that edge, we arrive at a
node of degree k+1 (equivalently, the node has k emanat-
ing edges). For undirected networks, we have the deriva-
tion qk =
1
2
∑∞
j=0 ejk +
1
2
∑∞
j=0 ekj =
∑∞
j=0 ejk. (The
same end expression holds for directed networks, where
we must follow the edge’s direction.)
The Pearson correlation coefficient r for degree pairs
gives us a measure of assortativity, and is given by
r =
1
σ2q
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
jk(ejk − qjqk) (1)
where σ2q =
∑
k k
2qk − [
∑
k kqk]
2 is the variance in the
number of emanating edges from a node arrived at by
a random edge. Note that the choice of ejk almost pre-
scribes the form of the resulting network’s degree distri-
bution, pk. The one piece of information missing is the
abundance of nodes with no connections, p0, which we
must define independently. A link between the ejk and pk
for undirected networks follows from the observation that
qk is readily determined from the degree distribution: a
randomly chosen edge leads to a degree k + 1 node with
probability qk = (k+1)pk+1/kavg where kavg =
∑∞
k=0 kpk
is the average degree. We therefore have the connection
qk =
∑∞
j=0 ejk = (k + 1)pk+1/kavg. Now, in isolating the
pk, we do not need to know kavg. It is enough to know
pk ∝ qk/(k + 1) for k > 0, since we can find the nor-
malization constant (which is in fact kavg) by requiring∑∞
k=1 pk = 1− p0.
Finding the probability of triggering a global spreading
event reduces to standard percolation once we find the
probability that an individual node is vulnerable. We
allow this probability to be a function of node degree
k, using the notation bk1 (more generally, we write the
probability that a node of degree k switches to state σ1
given l contacts in state σ1 as bkl). We first determine
whether nodes are vulnerable or not, removing them from
the network in the latter case. Finally, if global spreading
occurs on the resulting reduced network, global spreading
must occur on the original network.
II. ANALYTIC RESULTS
Building on the work of Newman [21], we find closed
form expressions for several probability generating func-
tions related to component sizes. The key probability we
need to characterize is fn,j, which is the probability that
an edge emanating from a degree j + 1 node leads to a
finite vulnerable subcomponent of size n = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
3Writing the marginal generating function for fn,j as
Fj(x;~b1) =
∑∞
n=0 fn,jx
n, we have the following recursive
relationship:
Fj(x;~b1) = x
0
∞∑
k=0
ejk
qj
(1− bk+1,1)
+ x
∞∑
k=0
ejk
qj
bk+1,1
[
Fk(x;~b1)
]k
, (2)
where j = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In both terms, we have the quantity
ejk/qj which represents the normalized probability that
an edge from a degree node j + 1 leads to a degree k+ 1
node. For undirected networks, we obtain this probabil-
ity as (ejk + ekj)/(
∑∞
k=0 ejk + ekj) = 2ejk/2qj = ejk/qj.
The first term in Eq. (2) records the probability that an
edge from a degree j+1 node leads immediately to a non-
vulnerable node, and hence a vulnerable subcomponent
of size 0.
The second term involves a composition of generating
functions. The generating function Fk is the argument
of
∞∑
k=0
ejk
qj
bk+1,1x
k, (3)
which is itself the generating function for the probability
that an edge from a degree j+1 node leads to a vulnerable
node with k emanating edges [23]. Finally, the x leading
the second term in Eq. (2) accounts for the k + 1 degree
node itself.
Our task is now to find critical points indicating the
onset of a giant component as we vary network structure
by altering the ejk and bk1. We compute the average
size of a finite vulnerable component found by following
an edge from a degree j + 1 node, given by F ′j(1;
~b1).
Differentiating Eq. (2), setting x = 1, and substituting
qj =
∑∞
k=0 ejk, we have
qjF
′
j(1;
~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
ejkbk+1,1+
∞∑
k=0
kejkbk+1,1F
′
k(1;
~b1). (4)
(We have used the fact that Fk(1;~b1) = 1 for networks
without a giant component, and all components con-
tribute to the generating function of fn,k.) Rearranging
Eq. (4), we have a linear system
∞∑
k=0
(δjkqk − kbk+1,1ejk)F
′
k(1;
~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
ejkbk+1,1 (5)
which we write as
A
E,~b1
~F ′(1;~b1) = E~b1 (6)
where [
A
E,~b1
]
j+1,k+1
= δjkqk − kbk+1,1ejk, (7)[
~F ′(1;~b1)
]
k+1
= F ′k(1;
~b1), (8)
[E]j+1,k+1 = ejk, (9)
and
[
~b1
]
k+1
= bk+1,1 (10)
for j, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . A solution exists when A
E,~b1
is invertible, i.e., its determinant is non-zero. We then
have
~F ′(1;~b1) = A
−1
E,~b1
E~b1. (11)
Our condition for the onset of global spreading is there-
fore ∣∣∣A
E,~b1
∣∣∣ = 0. (12)
with A
E,~b1
defined in Eq. (7). We note that for networks
where one or more degrees are not present (which we will
encounter in our later specific examples), we omit the
rows and columns of the above matrices corresponding
to those degrees. For simplicity, we present our general
results for networks assuming all degrees are represented,
observing that adjustments to specific sets of degrees are
straightforward.
For uncorrelated networks, upon substituting ejk =
qjqk, the above collapses to the known condition
∞∑
k=0
bk1(k − 1)
kpk
kavg
= 1, (13)
as expected [13]. Moreover, F ′k(1;
~b1) is seen to be inde-
pendent of k, since the first node of an edge is now unre-
lated to the other node and hence also the subcomponent
it leads to. We provide details for these calculations in
the Appendix.
Returning to the general case of degree-correlated net-
works, we see that when bk1 = b, a constant for all k,
we have a disease-like contagion process. Furthermore,
when b = 1, all nodes are vulnerable, and we have found
the condition for a giant component, equivalent to that
obtained by Newman [21]. (Note that when bk1 = b,
we have E~b1 = b~q since [E~b1]j+1 =
∑∞
k=0 ejkbk+1,1 =
b
∑∞
k=0 ejk = bqj+1.)
We next consider two probability distributions pertain-
ing to component size: (1) gn, the probability that a ran-
domly chosen node belongs to a vulnerable component
of size n, and (2) hn, the probability that a randomly
chosen node belongs or is adjacent to a vulnerable com-
ponent of size n. Knowing gn helps us find the size of the
largest vulnerable component, whose presence or absence
dictates whether or not global cascades are possible for
infinite random networks. The second probability hn will
aid us in determining the probability of triggering a glob-
al cascade. The triggering node, which is exogenously
4switched to state σ1 may be either vulnerable and part
of the largest vulnerable component, or non-vulnerable
and connected to one or more nodes in the largest vul-
nerable component. For the standard giant component
case where bk1 = 1, we have gn = hn; otherwise, these
distributions are likely distinct.
As for the fk,n, we find closed form expressions for
the generating functions associated with gn and hn. The
generating function for gn satisfies the following relation-
ship:
G(x;~b1) =x
0
∞∑
k=0
pk(1− bk1) + x
1p0b01
+ x
∞∑
k=1
pkbk1
[
Fk−1(x;~b1)
]k
. (14)
The x0 term carries the probability that a randomly
selected node will not be in state σ1; the second term
accounts for the randomly chosen node being vulnerable
but having degree 0; and the third term again uses the
composition rule for sums of random variables of random
sizes [23]. The generating function
∑∞
k=1 pkbk1x
k cor-
responds to the probability distribution for a randomly
chosen node to have degree k and be vulnerable. Note
that the argument Fk−1 appears in the last term rather
than Fk because Fk−1 by definition corresponded to a
degree k node.
The generating function for the triggering distribution
satisfies a simplified version of Eq. (14):
H(x;~b1) = x
1p0 + x
∞∑
k=1
pk
[
Fk−1(x;~b1)
]k
. (15)
For the triggering distribution, the first node is now
always switched to state σ1, regardless of whether it is
itself vulnerable or not. The x1 term accounts for this
initial node having degree 0 and hence being unable to
trigger any other node. If the initial node has at least one
neighbor, then spreading may occur and we can make
use of the basic degree generating function
∑∞
k=1 pkx
k
combined with the generating function Fk−1(x;~b1) for
finite vulnerable subcomponent size. As per our previ-
ous examples, the preceding factor x in the second term
accounts for the initial node. In effect, bk1 = 1 for the
triggering node as it is always forced to be switched to
state σ1, and indeed setting bk1 = 1 in Eq. (14) directly
yields Eq. (15).
Now, the fraction of nodes in the largest vulnerable
component is given by Svuln = 1−G(1;~b1), since G(1;~b1)
can be seen as the probability that a random node is part
of a finite vulnerable component (including one of size 0).
Setting x = 1 in Eq. (14), we have
Svuln =1−G(1;~b1)
=
∞∑
k=0
pkbk1 − p0b01 −
∞∑
k=1
pkbk1
[
Fk−1(1;~b1)
]k
.
(16)
In the same fashion as for Svuln, the probability of trig-
gering a cascade can be determined using H(x;~b1):
Strig =1−H(1;~b1)
=1−
∞∑
k=0
pk
[
Fk−1(1;~b1)
]k
. (17)
The size of the triggering component can also be obtained
by first making the observation that an initially switched
node of degree k triggers a cascade with probability
S
(k)
trig = 1−
[
Fk−1(1;~b1)
]k
. (18)
This is the probability that at least one edge from a
degree k node leads to a giant component of vulnera-
ble nodes. We then have Strig =
∑∞
k=0 pkS
(k)
trig, which is
in agreement with Eq. (17).
Both Svuln and Strig depend on Fk(1;~b1), for which we
obtain a potentially infinite set of closed-form, coupled,
nonlinear recursive expressions from Eq. (2):
Fj(1;~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
ejk
qj
(1−bk+1,1)+
∞∑
k=0
ejk
qj
bk+1,1
[
Fk(1;~b1 )
]k
(19)
where we have substituted qj =
∑∞
k=0 ejk. Solving
Eq. (19) will almost always involve numerical techniques
(though in Section III, we examine a case that has ana-
lytic solutions). The uncorrelated, pure random network
version for the giant component (bk1 = 1) may serve as
some inspiration. There, we have no dependence on the
degree of the initial node and the problem reduces to
solving F (1,~1) =
∑∞
k=0 qk[F (1,
~1)]k. Both F (1,~1) = 0
and F (1,~1) = 1 are solutions and any initial estimate in
between leads to, upon iteration, an intermediate solu-
tion, if one exists. Similarly, iteration of Eq. (19) should
generally reach the appropriate fixed point solution.
We can also and more easily determine the average
size of all vulnerable components (applicable when no
giant vulnerable component is present since we again use
Fk(1;~b1) = 1):
G′(1,~b1) = ~p
T~b1 + kavg(E~b1)
T
A
−1
E,~b1
(E~b1), (20)
where [~p]k = pk. If we allow spreading to start from any
node by forcing the first node to be in state σ1, then the
average size is instead given by
H ′(1,~b1) = 1 + kavg(E~1)
T
A
−1
E,~b1
(E~b1). (21)
We complete our analysis with a description of the
expected final size of a global spreading event, when it
occurs. We use the results of recent work by Gleeson and
Calahane [19], and subsequently Gleeson [20], who have
explicated an elegant, general solution to the distributed,
infinite seed case for a variety of spreading models on a
wide range of random networks.
5Their key observation is that a node i (degree ki)
switching to state σ1 at time step n can only be due to
previous switching in nodes within n steps of i (includ-
ing, trivially, i itself). Furthermore, this neighborhood
of i must be a pure branching network, i.e., a tree rooted
at i. At time step n = 1, only i’s immediate neighbors
influence i, and these are in state σ1 with probability φ0.
We write the probability that one of i’s edges connects
to a node in state σ1 at time step n+1 as θki,n. At time
step n = 2, the effect of next neighbors is felt, and i’s
degree k neighbors are now in state σ1 with probabili-
ty θk,1 which in turn depends generally on θk′,0 = φ0,
k′ ≥ 1. Allowing n to increase, we are lead to a recursive
expression for the θk,n as follows. The expected size of a
global spreading event given a fraction φ0 of nodes active
at time t = 0 is φ∞, which is obtained in the n→∞ limit
of the following equations [20]:
φn+1 = φ0 + (1− φ0)
∞∑
k=0
pk
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
θ ik,n(1− θk,n)
k−ibki
(22)
where
θj,n+1 = φ0 + (1− φ0)× (23)
∞∑
k=1
ej−1,k−1
qj−1
k−1∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)
θ ik,n(1− θk,n)
k−1−ibki
and, again, θk,0 = φ0 and bki is the probability that
a degree k node switches to state σ1 if exactly i of its
neighbors have switched.
We thus observe a symmetry between the explana-
tions for when global spreading may occur from a single
seed and if so, to what extent. The former concerns the
progress of a spreading event as it moves outward from
a single seed through a random branching network, and
the latter hinges on how switching converges on a cen-
tral node, again traversing a branching network, but in
the reverse direction (this process is similarly described
in [24] for a particular disease spreading model involving
repeated contacts).
Note that φn must always increase or stay the same,
since nodes never switch off, and must therefore approach
a limit as n→∞. This implies that node i feels the effect
of initial activations within a finite number of steps, and
indeed we see that the approach to φ∞ is rapid. Whether
or not a small seed takes off can be determined from
Eq. (23) by examining the matrix dθj,n+1/dθk,n evaluat-
ed at θk,n = 0 [20], and yields a condition equivalent to
our requirement |A| = 0 (Eq. (12)).
While these equations are derived with the assumption
of an infinite seed (if an arbitrarily small one, fraction-
wise), they nevertheless perform extremely well in the
limit φ0 → 0. Even so, they cannot capture the salience
of a global vulnerable component for the single seed case,
which must be present for spreading to succeed. By com-
parison, for the infinite seed model, spreading always
occurs if the cascade condition is met. However, as noted
in [20], by separately determining Strig, we can account
for the major features of the single seed model: the prob-
ability of generating a global spreading event, Strig, and
its expected size φ∞. We note that in [20], an expression
for Strig for uncorrelated random networks was obtained
using θ∞; here, we have generalized Strig to uncorrelated
networks directly from the standard generating function
approach.
III. APPLICATION TO A SIMPLE FAMILY OF
RANDOM NETWORKS
For a tractable test case, we examine a family of infinite
random networks with nodes having either of two degrees
ka and kb where ka < kb. We consider the general class
of threshold profiles ~b1 such that degree ka nodes are
vulnerable and degree kb nodes are not. We are able
to obtain expressions for the size of the vulnerable and
triggering components as a function of assortativity, and
we make comparisons with simulations for the (ka, kb) =
(3, 4) case.
We wish to consider the full range of assortativity
and this constrains the relative probabilities of the two
degrees in the following way. We specifically need
pka =
kb
ka
pkb , (24)
since when r = −1, degree ka nodes connect only to
degree kb nodes, and so there must be relatively fewer of
the latter. We therefore have
pka =
kb
ka + kb
, pkb =
ka
ka + kb
, and pk = 0 otherwise.
(25)
Values of r other than -1 add no further constraints. The
corresponding E matrix is independent of ka and kb and
has the form
E =
1
4
[
1 + r 1− r
1− r 1 + r
]
, (26)
where we have left out irrelevant rows and columns of
zeros. The condition for a giant component given by
Eqs. (7) and (12) is then
0 = |A
E,~b1
| = 14
∣∣∣∣ 1− 12 (ka − 1)(1 + r) 01
2 (ka − 1)(r − 1) 1
∣∣∣∣ (27)
= 12 −
1
4 (ka − 1)(1 + r).
We therefore have a phase transition when
r = −1 +
2
ka − 1
, (28)
with a giant component of vulnerable nodes arising and
then growing as assortativity increases. (Note that when
no giant component exists, |A| is positive.) For the case
ka = 3, the phase transition occurs at r = 0, and as ka
6increases, the location of the phase transition moves to
more negative values of r.
We next determine the size of the vulnerable and trig-
gering components. We find the probabilities of reach-
ing a finite component from degree ka and kb nodes via
Eq. (19):
Fka−1(1;~b1 ) =
1− r
2
+
1 + r
2
[
Fka−1(1;~b1 )
]ka−1
, (29)
Fkb−1(1;
~b1 ) =
1 + r
2
+
1− r
2
[
Fka−1(1;
~b1 )
]ka−1
. (30)
Only the first equation need be solved and is in general
a ka − 1 degree polynomial in Fka−1(1;
~b1 ). We now
specialize our results for the case ka = 3. We have a
quadratic equation from which we obtain
F2(1;~b1 ) =
{
1 for r ≤ 0,
1−r
1+r for r ≥ 0.
(31)
and
Fkb−1(1;
~b1 ) =


1 for r ≤ 0,
1+r
2
[
1 +
(
1−r
1+r
)3]
for r ≥ 0.
(32)
Note that in finding F2(1;~b1 ), we have had to make
a choice between the two roots of the quadratic given
in Eq. (31). First, we have only one realistic solution in
the interval [0, 1] for r < 0, namely F2(1;~b1 ) = 1 (the
other solution, (1 − r)/(1 + r), exceeds 1 for r < 0).
Second, in considering the limit r = 1 where degree 3
nodes are connected only to other degree 3 nodes form-
ing a giant component, we require that the probability of
reaching a finite component must drop to 0. We there-
fore see that (1 − r)/(1 + r) must be the correct choice
since then F2(1;~b1 ) = 0 at r = 1. We further observe
that the two roots cross when r = 0, and for r > 0, the
root (1− r)/(1 + r) is less than the root at unity. Thus,
by an expectation of continuity, (1 − r)/(1 + r) must be
the solution for all of r ≥ 0.
We next determine the size of the vulnerable com-
ponent and triggering probabilities as functions of r
using Eqs. (16), (17), and (18). For r < 0, we have
Svuln = Strig = 0, and for r ≥ 0,
Svuln =
kb
kb + 3
[
1−
(
1− r
1 + r
)3]
, (33)
S
(3)
trig =1−
(
1− r
1 + r
)3
, (34)
S
(kb)
trig =1−
(
1 + r
2
)kb [
1 +
(
1− r
1 + r
)3]kb
,
and
Strig =1−
kb
kb + 3
(
1− r
1 + r
)3
(35)
−
3
kb + 3
(
1 + r
2
)kb [
1 +
(
1− r
1 + r
)3]kb
.
As shown in Fig. 1(a), we obtain excellent agreement
between equations and the output of simulations for
kb = 4 on networks with N = 0.98 × 10
5 nodes and
τ = 1/3. We used this particular value of N since
it is the nearest number to 105 that is divisible by 7
[required by Eqs. (24) and (25)] and, for convenience,
also a multiple of 100. As was observed for the origi-
nal threshold model on random networks [13], we find
that well-connected networks near the transition to a
non-percolating largest vulnerable component are of a
‘robust-yet-fragile’ nature [26]. We see in Fig. 1(a) that
if assortativity r is just slightly positive, and if the initial
seed is in the small triggering component present, then
spreading reaches the entire network. These otherwise
highly resilient networks have an Achilles heel that leads
to a complete transition in individual node states. Fur-
thermore, finite size effects may be significant: for the
networks with N = 9800 nodes, our simulations show
that global spreading is possible for r as low as −0.07.
While our expressions for Svuln and Strig only depend
coarsely on~b1, the final extent of a global spreading event
S is more sensitive to changes in node response functions.
Taking as an example one of our bimodal networks with
ka = 3 and kb = 10, we see any value of τ in (
1
10 ,
1
3 ] is
equivalent to τ = 13 , as far as Svuln and Strig are con-
cerned, since only degree 3 nodes are vulnerable. How-
ever, whether or not degree 10 nodes are vulnerable to
i neighbors switching to state σ1 depends on τ meeting
and exceeding i10 . For the case ka = 3 and kb = 4, the
results we present here apply for all τ in (14 ,
1
3 ].
For the final size of global spreading events, S, manip-
ulations of Eq. (23) for ka = 3 and kb = 4 show we need
to solve the following for θ3,∞:
θ3,∞ =
1 + r
2
i(2−θ3,∞)θ3,∞+
1− r
2
(3−θ4,∞)θ
2
4,∞ (36)
where
θ4,∞ =
1
1− r
θ3,∞(1− 3r + 2rθ3,∞) (37)
for 0 ≤ r < 1. Knowing that θ3,∞ = 1 is a solution
of Eq. (36) means we can reduce the problem to solving
for the roots of a quartic, for which we could obtain a
complete analytic solution. For our purposes, numerical
simulation is sufficient.
Our simulations and numerical analyses indicate the
presence of another kind of phase transition in S. At the
upper limit of r = 1, the network is separated into two
giant, fully-connected components, one comprising solely
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FIG. 1: (a) Three key spreading measures as a function of
assortativity r for networks with Pk =
4
7
δk3 +
3
7
δk4. Solid
lines indicate theoretical curves and symbols represent mea-
surements from simulations. The three curves are (1) the
fractional size of the largest vulnerable component, Svuln,
(Eq. (33), circles); (2) the fractional size of the largest trig-
gering component, Strig, (Eq. (35), squares); and (3) the
fractional size of global spreading events S (Eq. (22), dia-
monds). The upper discontinuous phase transition in S occurs
at r = rupperc = 0.77485 ± 0.00001. The data shown were
obtained from networks with N=0.98×105 nodes (correlations
were generated using a shuffling algorithm described in [25])
with initial seeds placed at each node of 10 sample networks
for a total of 9.8×105 samples per each value of r. (b) Solu-
tions for θ3,∞ and θ4,∞, the probability that edges leading to
degree 3 and 4 nodes will be from nodes in state σ1 in the
long time limit (see Eqs. (36) and (37).) Solid and dashed
lines indicate stable and unstable ones respectively. When r
reaches rupperc , a repeated solution appears for (θ3,∞, θ4,∞),
distinct from (1, 1), giving rise to the discontinuous upper
phase transition in S.
k = 3 degree nodes and the other k = 4 degree nodes (the
giant component is of fractional size 1 for all other values
of r). Spreading therefore occurs only in the k = 3 degree
node component when r = 1, and, as shown in Fig. 1(a),
the three quantities S, Svuln, and Strig all equal 4/7 for
complete assortativity.
As we decrease r however, the possibility that a degree
k = 4 node is connected to two (or more) degree k = 3
nodes in the giant vulnerable component increases. The
expected size φ∞ of a global spreading event grows grad-
ually until it reaches a discontinuous phase transition and
φ∞ jumps to 1. Through numerical analysis of Eq. (36),
we see that as r increases, a repeated root θ3,∞ appears
when r = rupperc ≃ 0.775. The roots become real and sep-
arate with both of them limiting to 1 as r→ 1. Fig. 1(b)
shows how both θ3,∞ and θ4,∞ behave as a function of
r. Note that the discontinuity in the final size of a global
spreading event is not reflected in the curves for Strig or
Svuln, which both change smoothly for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have developed a series of theoretical expressions
for a general class of spreading models on random net-
works with tunable degree assortativity r. Our main
results are the derivation of the fractional size of the
giant vulnerable and triggering components as a func-
tion of degree-degree distribution ejk. When we allow all
nodes to be susceptible with uniform probability b, our
results reduce to the standard disease-like spreading case,
and when we further set b = 1, we obtain the conditions
for the existence of a giant component.
When we set r = 0, we also retrieve the condition for
the existence of a giant vulnerable component (Eq. (12))
along with its size (Eq. (16)) in pure random networks
with arbitrary degree distributions [13]. For the trigger-
ing component, aside from our work for general r, we have
also added to known results for the r = 0 case. We have
obtained the probability that an exogenously activated
node of degree k may trigger a global spreading event
(Eq. (18)) and hence the probability that a randomly
chosen node may do the same (Eq. (17)). Our work com-
plements the results of Gleeson [20] which determines the
final size of a global spreading event (Eqs. (22) and (23)).
We note that a basic description of many kinds of spread-
ing from a single initial seed must separately report (1)
the probability of a global spreading event Ptrig, and (2)
the expected final size S. The distribution of final sizes
is often bimodal and an overall expected size conflates
Ptrig and S in a potentially misleading way, since no size
other than 0 and S are in fact possible. Finally, the sim-
ple family of random networks we have considered here
with Pk =
4
7δk3 +
3
7δk4 have allowed us to demonstrate,
for one example, the validity of our theoretical results for
Svuln(r) and Strig(r).
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8APPENDIX: CALCULATIONS REGARDING
COLLAPSE OF GENERAL GLOBAL
SPREADING CONDITION FOR
UNCORRELATED NETWORKS
In the main text, we noted that the general condition
for global spreading, that
∣∣∣A
E,~b1
∣∣∣ = 0 (Eq. (12)), collaps-
es to the appropriate condition for uncorrelated networks
when we set ejk = qjqk (Eq. (13)). We demonstrate this
in two distinct ways. First, we take a direct route by
setting ejk = qjqk in the definition of AE,~b1 :[
A
E,~b1
]
j+1,k+1
= δjkqk − kbk+1,1qjqk
= (δjk − qjkbk+1,1) qk. (38)
The qk that has been factored out stands as a multi-
ple for the kth column, and therefore, by multilineari-
ty of determinants [27], contributes to the determinant
of A
E,~b1
as a simple overall multiplicative factor. In
finding |A
E,~b1
|, we can therefore focus on the matrix
[δjk − qjkbk+1,1]. We find the determinant of this matrix
by finding its eigenvalues, which are the eigenvalues of
[−qjkbk+1,1] incremented by 1 due to the addition of the
identity matrix. Since [−qjkbk+1,1] is an outer product
of the two vectors [−qj ] and [kbk+1,1], we have a rank
one matrix which therefore has a sole non-zero eigen-
value corresponding to an eigenvector in the direction
of [−qj]. We find the non-zero eigenvalue by explicit-
ly applying the matrix [−qjkbk+1,1] to [−qj ], giving us
λ1 = −
∑∞
k=0 kbk+1,1qk. Shifting the summation index,
we have λ1 = −
∑∞
k=1(k − 1)bk,1qk−1, and λi = 0 for
i ≥ 2. We now add 1 to all eigenvalues to obtain
λ′1 = 1 −
∑∞
k=1(k − 1)bk,1qk−1 and λ
′
i = 1 for i ≥ 2.
The determinant of A
E,~b1
is given by the product of the
λ′i along with the product of the qk elements we initially
factored out:
|A
E,~b1
| =
(
∞∏
k=0
qk
)(
1−
∞∑
k=1
(k − 1)bk,1qk−1
)
. (39)
Since the qk are not equal to 0, the condition that
|A
E,~b1
| = 0 for uncorrelated networks depends on the
second term: 0 = 1−
∑∞
k=1 bk,1(k− 1)qk−1. Substituting
qk = kpk/kavg gives us the desired condition of Eq. (13).
Secondly, we can also show that F ′k(1;
~b1) is indepen-
dent of k, meaning that the expected size of a finite sub-
component found at the other end of an edge connected
to a node of degree k+1 does not depend on the latter’s
degree. This will also lead us to the same condition for
global spreading we found above. To do so, we return to
Eq. (6) and set ejk = qjqk:
∞∑
k=0
(δjkqk − kbk+1,1qjqk)F
′
k(1;
~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
qjqkbk+1,1.
(40)
Breaking the left hand side into two pieces, carrying out
the first summation, and then dividing through by qj , we
obtain
F ′j(1;
~b1)−
∞∑
k=0
kbk+1,1qkF
′
k(1;
~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
qkbk+1,1. (41)
Upon rearranging, we can now express F ′j(1;
~b1) as a
function of terms not involving j (even if they include
summations involving F ′k(1;
~b1)), thereby demonstrating
independence:
F ′j(1;
~b1) =
∞∑
k=0
kbk+1,1qkF
′
k(1;
~b1) +
∞∑
k=0
qkbk+1,1. (42)
Setting F ′k(1;
~b1) = F
′(1;~b1) for all k, the above is now
solvable, and we find
F ′(1;~b1) =
∑∞
k=0 qkbk+1,1.
1−
∑∞
k=0 kbk+1,1qk
. (43)
Finally, we see that setting the denominator to 0 recovers
the condition for global spreading in uncorrelated net-
works.
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